A sideways look at Ukraine war news

Chris Johns

I write a (short) daily post for Powerscourt, a Strategic Communications company, based in London and Dublin. The idea is to summarise the news flow around the war in Ukraine - not so much the news that makes the front pages but more the stuff that we find interesting/relevant. News that may have not attracted the attention it deserves. Anyone interested in receiving the short email on a daily basis is welcome to contact Powerscourt here: insights@powerscourt-group.com.

If you haven’t done so already, please have a listen to our podcasts. Getting on for 200 past episodes, and our most recent offering, can be found here:

Monday February 13th

Aid to Ukraine doesn’t just take a military form. The EU, for example, announced an €18 billion financial package in December. The IMF has also provided financial assistance, in ways that often go beyond its usual remit of help to countries that are in balance of payments difficulties. An IMF mission to Kyiv today begins talks on the latest aid deal that could be worth $16 billion. Once the IMF ends up disbursing that kind of cash, other aid deals usually follow. 

The money is, of course, much needed, particularly as private sector lenders to Ukraine are thin on the ground. The debt rating agency Moody’s cut Ukraine’s score to its second lowest possible level on Friday, putting it on a par with Argentina. Moody’s thinks a restructuring of Ukrainian debt is probable, with an ultimate recovery rate for lenders of 35% - 65%. Formally (under the rules at least), Ukraine has yet to default as it has agreed with creditors to defer coupon and interest payments on around $6 billion of its debt. Bloomberg estimates Ukraine’s stock of external debt to be $23 billion. Markets have moved to anticipate a restructuring of the debt: Ukrainian bond prices fell by an average 77% over the last year.

 “A true friend is one who knows that our fight is Europe’s fight,” Ukraine’s defence ministry said today in a tweet thanking Denmark for a gift of 19 self-propelled howitzers. That represents the Dane’s entire stock of such weapons and has promoted a debate, echoed in many countries, about the rate of depletion of stocks of military hardware.

Bloomberg reports Italy’s industry minister saying the country can end its reliance on Russian gas imports  by the end of the year. Moreover, suggests Aldofo Urso, Italy can become a gas hub for Europe as it plans to double flows of imports from Azerbaijan via the Trans Adriatic pipeline.

Tuesday February 14th

A recent article in Foreign Policy captured the prevailing consensus of military experts. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops - more than three times the size of the original invasion force - have massed in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s defensive lines are ‘thicker’ - more men, more mines, deeper trenches. Russia’s offensive capabilities start with WW2 Red Army-style cannon fodder: waves of lightly armed and poorly trained conscripts/convicts. Coming up behind are ‘1800 tanks, 3,950 armored vehicles, 2,700 artillery systems, 810 Soviet-era multiple-rocket-launch systems such as Grad and Smerch, 400 fighter jets, and 300 helicopters’. So much for earlier reports that Russia was in danger of running out of munitions.

The Telegraph has raised Foreign Policy’s estimates and writes about 2000 tanks and an imminent  ‘huge invasion’ of the Donbas. Other media have joined in, breathlessly talking about the Russian offensive explicitly in terms of its likely success against Ukrainian forces that will get Western tanks and other munitions far too late. According to Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, speaking yesterday, all of that kit is on the move with the start of the much forecast Russian offensive. 

We might remind ourselves that we are at the first anniversary of a consensus that said any Russian invasion would need only a few days to take Kyiv.

Phillips P Obrien is a professor of strategic studies at St Andrews. He takes a different view, “I see no indication whatsoever that the Russians could attempt a major, air-armour breakout and exploitation. I don’t see how they could supply it, I don’t see any indication that their army knows how to execute it, and I can’t see how the Ukrainians could be caught by surprise were the Russians to attempt it.”

Obrien points us to a major Russian attack in the last few days in the area of Vuhledar. Spesnatz and other elite, well equipped, Russian forces are reported to have been involved. It’s not hard to find on social media plenty of pictures of destroyed Russian tanks and other hardware. And suggestions of horrendous Russian casualties and a failed assault. A hint that the offensive is not going all that well. So far at least. 

Wednesday February 15th

Reports that Russia is showing signs of deploying its mysteriously missing air force are consistent with similar stories about the ‘spring offensive’. Rather than use air power, Russia has, up until now at least, chosen to deploy its stock of drones, cruise missiles, dumb artillery and waves of ‘human bullets’. If Russian aeroplanes are finally to appear over Ukraine it could be a recognition that unless something changes, the next year of the war is going to look like the last, with the current offensive making only minor gains, if that. Ukraine no doubt has its own offensive plans. 

The US defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, is quoted by CNN flatly contradicting those press stories (carried prominently in the FT) about the sudden appearance of the Russian airforce. 

Perhaps aimed at widespread reports of Russian armour ‘massing’ for the next big push, the UK’s MoD today suggested that all is not well with Russian production of tanks and other military hardware. In an intelligence briefing, the MoD reminds us that Putin recently publicly rebuked one of his team - a deputy Prime Minister - responsible for arms manufacturing. 

Ex-President and current Deputy Chair of the State Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, recently took time out from calling for London and Washington DC to be nuked and demanded Russian tank manufacturers up their game. The MoD thinks Russian industry’s military output has become ‘a critical weakness’ for the war effort.

CNN, like many agencies, is carrying reports about the battle for Vuhledar. Astonishing losses of men and armour have provoked a furious response from pro-war Russian bloggers. Opinion is divided over whether the failure to take Vuhledar is the fault of poor tactics or inadequately trained conscripts. Over the last few days Russia has seemingly paused, or slowed, the frontal attacks and is instead bombarding Vuhledar with thermobaric missiles, prompting one analyst to conclude that Russia is good at destruction but hopeless at taking territory. 

Thursday February 16th

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius yesterday admitted that Europe will struggle to send even one battalion of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.  At the end of last month, the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, promised Kyiv two battalions. It seems that once the wraps have been taken off any tanks they have been able to find, the vehicles are found to be in a poor state of repair. 

Leonard Bershidsky, a Russian-born journalist now writing for Bloomberg, published two pieces today, both informative and insightful, both in stark contrast to the other. The first is a take on the current and future states of Russia and Ukraine’s economies. The second is an examination of the outsize role that poets play in Russian society and what those writers are saying now.

The eye-watering sums of money needed to rebuild Ukraine after the war will have to come from somewhere. If Ukraine wins, that cash can only come from the west. And, says Bershidsky, rebuilding will take at least a generation. If Russia wins, the Kremlin will have the responsibility of reconstruction. That suggests, were Russia to prevail, Ukraine won’t be rebuilt any time soon. 

While Russia’s economy seems to have weathered sanctions a lot better than their designers intended, energy and other embargoes are starting, gradually, to bite. Russian oil revenues are, finally, starting to fall and every rouble from energy sales is sent by the Kremlin to the military. That puts a squeeze on everyone else in Russia. Moscow finds itself in more than one tricky position. The only realistic prospect of sanctions ever being lifted involves losing the war.

Bershidsky is scathing about Russia’s poets who, over the course of the last year, have split into pro and anti-war factions. Writers could have taken a stand, pre-war, but by and large did not. “Like the Russian military, Russian culture is taking a beating because of its mediocrity: Surprised by a turn of events that would have been an opportunity for heroes and geniuses, it has produced in response only various flavours of whimpering.”

Friday February 18th

Be careful with World War comparisons. Russian tactics are often compared to the ‘human wave’ approach deployed with military success against Germany in World War 2. That conflict is remembered in Russia as ‘The Great Patriotic War’. Today, Russian soldiers that return to base alive after an assault are reportedly being treated as deserters. As at Stalingrad 70 years ago, Russian conscripts are told that retreat brings a far worse death than going forward. Everyone remembers the victories that such tactics brought in the 1940s. There is little mention of how they failed in World War 1, led to revolution in 1917, and the toppling of the Tsar.

Stalingrad itself was also an example of how a well defended target can often contribute to the ultimates exhaustion of attacking forces. Zelensky yesterday described  Bakhmut as ‘a living fortress’, consistent with the idea that Ukraine is patiently waiting for wave after wave of Russian ‘cannon fodder’ while carefully preparing for its own counter-offensive. The Battle of the Bulge at the turn of 1944/45 is another example. German troops experienced initial success with their counter attack, culminating in the encirclement of Bastogne, defended by the U.S. 101st Airborne division. After multiple attacks, the Germans were ultimately forced to retreat. 

The UK’s Ministry of Defence this morning released, for the first time, it’s own estimates of Russian casualties. 175,000-200,000 killed or wounded, with a death rate ‘unusually high in modern times’. Russia has experienced 40,000-60,000 fatalities. This time a year ago it was widely reported that Russia had massed 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine and that would be sufficient to take Kyiv in a matter of days. Today, the UK’s defence minister suggests that over 90% of Russia’s army is Ukraine. That number looks a tad on the high side but it is indicative of how the best laid plans rarely survive first contact with the enemy.