Ukraine war diary

Is Putin toast? No - not yet, at least. Prigozhin should avoid tall buildings.

Chris Johns

I write a (short) daily post for Powerscourt, a Strategic Communications company, based in London and Dublin. The idea is to summarise the news flow around the war in Ukraine - not so much the news that makes the front pages but more the stuff that we find interesting/relevant. News that may have not attracted the attention it deserves. Anyone interested in receiving the short email on a daily basis is welcome to contact Powerscourt here: insights@powerscourt-group.com.

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Monday June 26th

Where is Prigozhin? Just one unanswered question amongst many. Speculation is rife about the deal supposedly negotiated between Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and the mercenary boss. Some reports suggest Prigozhin got cold feet because he failed to get enough support from the regular Russian army. Others reckon he must have been bought off with cash. 

Wagner is a thoroughly nasty, but effective, bunch of thugs responsible for Russia’s only ‘victory’ in recent months, the taking of Bakhmut. Since the group was founded in 2014 (to help with the annexation of Crimea), reports of Wagner atrocities have come from Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Libya and Syria. Wagner may have disbanded under the deal. Alternatively, it may, according to a former chief of the UK General Staff, be regrouping in Belarus ahead of another attempt to take Kyiv.

“Putin is toast’ is quite headline and expresses a degree of certainty not fully shared by your correspondent. But it’s the tone of much analysis and commentary over the past few hours. Those precise words were used by the former editor of Handelsblatt Global, Andreas Kluth, writing this morning for Bloomberg. Kluth, and many others, think Putin has made several catastrophic errors.

The first was to mention 1917. The comparison with the Russian Amy’s mutiny while fighting in WW1 will remind Russian’s that things didn’t end well for Tsar Nicholas II and could spark similar thoughts about Russia’s current leader. The second was Putin’s promise of severe punishment for Wagner. If you are going to play the strongman you have to deliver on your commitments. Dropping all charge against the mutineers doesn’t really count. It wouldn’t surprise me if both parties end up reneging on whatever deal they have concocted. 

Prigozhin’s social media rants included an evisceration of Putin’s rationale for the war. Meanwhile, the war continues with reports of ongoing fighting around, yes, Bakhmut. It seems the Ukrainians are making gradual progress around the Northern and Southern flanks of the city. 

Tuesday June 27th

Last Autumn’s lightning Ukrainian offensive caught Russia by surprise and a large amount of territory was regained by Kyiv. But the gains were only part of what had been lost earlier in the war. No territory taken by Russia in the earlier 2014 ‘uprising’ was given back. Yesterday, a small advance by airborne troops east from the village of Krasnohorivka, near Donetsk city, was the first bit of Ukraine lost nearly a decade ago to be recaptured. Today’s UK Ministry of Defence intelligence briefing suggests that Russian affiliated local militias and Chechen forces operating in Donetsk have been overstretched by multiple Ukrainian assaults.

The counter offensive proceeds at its ‘incremental’ pace. A total of 17 square kilometres have been recaptured over the past week. The total currently stands at 130 sq km. That includes further small gains yesterday in the Bakhmut area.

Belarus is reported by the Institute for the Study of War to be building a base for Wagner fighters. No immediate threat to Ukraine arises from the facility which is 200 kilometres from the border. Putin said yesterday that Prigozhin’s mercenaries could join the regular army, retire, or go to Belarus. Those that choose to leave Russia risk being seen by the Kremlin as loyal to Prigozhin and are, therefore, self-identifying as traitors. it could be a rather obvious trap. Belarusian President Lukashenko is most unlikely to resist any extradition requests coming his way from Moscow. Putin is many things, but revanchism is one of his dominant behavioural traits. Retribution is unlikely to be swift but it will be bloody. 

Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov yesterday reassured allies that Russia’s commitments in Africa will not be reduced by Wagner’s dissolution. It should be remembered that Wagner is the only Russian army that has achieved anything of substance in the war. The absence of Russian reserves was noticeable during Wagner’s march on Moscow - the bulk of Russia’s forces appear to be committed in Ukraine. It is, therefore, questionable whether the Kremlin has the necessary resources to continue its military activities in Africa and elsewhere.

Wednesday June 28th

Speculation continues to swirl over the true objectives of Wagner’s short-lived mutiny. Several observers suggest that Prigozhin must have had help or, at the very least, expected help. One reason, perhaps, why he stopped so abruptly was that assistance from key elements of the Russian army was not forthcoming. Standing aside is not the same as joining in.

The New York Times suggests today that some top Russian generals had advance knowledge of Wagner’s march on Moscow. But tacit support didn’t turn into actual support. The NYT, briefed by US intelligence officials, fingers General Sergey Surovikin, formerly in charge of the war in Ukraine and designer of the ‘Surovikin line’ of defences, currently a key reason why the counter offensive is going so slowly. Surovikin is that rare beast, a thoroughly competent Russian general. But also a brutal one, with command history in Syria and, early in his career, served as a commando in Afghanistan. He is said to be a friend of Prigozhin’s but I doubt that word means what many of us think it does.

The factional nature of Russia’s military is well known. Nevertheless, loyalty to Putin has, until last weekend, been unquestioned. The notion that significant generals are starting to wonder about Putin’s future is new. Alternatively, if I wanted to sow division in the Kremlin, I would seed stories in key media outlets about how certain generals are thinking about the post-Putin future. 

Meanwhile, Putin tried yesterday to change perceptions of  Prigozhin, via a speech that described the ‘boss of Concord’ (the parent company of Wagner) as a corrupt liar. Putin seems to recognise Wagner’s popularity on the street and wants public opinion to revise its view of Prigozhin. Tying the name Concord to Prigozhin rather than Wagner is an interesting rhetorical trick. The Institute for the Study of War suggests that Putin can’t kill Prigozhin just yet, for fear of making him a martyr. 

Thursday June 29th

According to several unnamed Russian elites, the status quo is untenable. Bloomberg today reports interviews with several Moscow business leaders and individuals close to the Kremlin who appear to be more rattled by Prigozhin’s march on Moscow than they were by the original invasion. Pressure is mounting on Putin to put all of Russia on a war footing, including mass mobilisation. Despite the disquiet, nobody sees an obvious alternative to Putin but many are beefing up personal security measures just in case a chaotic power transition takes place. Inevitably, and disturbingly, some people think use of tactical nuclear weapons will become more likely if Ukraine makes significant progress on the battlefield.

In a fascinating piece in today’s Times, Juliet Samuel takes a deep dive into the one area of Russia’s army that can still be accurately described as ‘elite’. The ‘Gumo’, a force of 30,000-40,000 troops, properly known as the 12th Chief Directorate, persist with policies and procedures that very effectively guard Russia’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. A little known consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall was the appearance in Russia of American advisers who helped train the Gumo and developed processes for protecting nuclear facilities that continue to the present day. Samuel describes the tens of billions given to Gumo to secure the care and maintenance of thousands of atomic bombs and missiles. 

The cooperation with America lasted for twenty years. It is a self-contained system designed for all potential eventualities, including potential stealing of weapons by terrorists and/or factions within the Russian army. All eventualities have been thought through bar one obvious exception: a chaotic power struggle in the Kremlin. Nobody seems to be quite sure how safe the weapons would be if there is a fight to replace Putin. Perhaps Wagner accompanied its abortive march on Moscow to the sounds of the Flight of the Valkyries. 

Friday June 30th

Alexey Navalny, the jailed Russian dissident, currently on trial for another long list of trumped up charges, points out on social media that his alleged crimes are exactly the same as the ones recently committed by Wagner. His charge sheet currently includes an accusation that he tried ‘forming an organisation to overthrow President Putin by violent means’. Leonid Bershidsky, a Bloomberg columnist, points out today that it was no surprise that Prigozhin made a dash to Belarus rather than risking Navalny’s fate: years and years behind bars. Bershidsky reckons, not unreasonably, that Navalny represents much more of a threat to Putin than Prigozhin, ‘even if the latter managed to do more damage to Putin personally in one tense day than the former in almost two decades of political activity. 

Putin’s system is not what it appears. He is not, and never has been, an all-powerful dictator. Rather, he runs the system created by Boris Yeltsin, one defined, according to Bershidsky, by ‘agility, insolent risk-taking, greed and a need always to be a step ahead of adversaries’. There are a lot of oligarchs, security officers, media personalities, bureaucrats and other functionaries that tolerate Putin because he keeps them fed. And they understand Putin’s ‘divide and rule system’. It is a purely transactional relationship wholly based on self interest and zero personal loyalty. This group, it is argued in many quarters, merely stood by last week-end and watched what would happen next. They would have accepted Prigozhin if he had prevailed or, more likely, the anonymous individual who would have stepped out of the shadows to take over. 

Belarusian leader Lukashenko claimed this week that the Kremlin was only able to assemble a ‘ragtag force of 10,000 men, including cadets and cops, to defend Moscow’. The mystery of why Prigozhin stopped only gets deeper. He could have prevailed because he understands Putin’s system and would have simply continued its operation - feeding the elites - if he had taken over. Navalny, on the other hand, would be a completely different proposition: the system would face a famine.