Ukraine War Diary

Counteroffensive or shaping operation?

Chris Johns

I write a (short) daily post for Powerscourt, a Strategic Communications company, based in London and Dublin. The idea is to summarise the news flow around the war in Ukraine - not so much the news that makes the front pages but more the stuff that we find interesting/relevant. News that may have not attracted the attention it deserves. Anyone interested in receiving the short email on a daily basis is welcome to contact Powerscourt here: insights@powerscourt-group.com.

Monday July 24th

The war has accelerated the development of drone technology. Ukraine has been adept at improvisation and innovation while Russia has imported drones from anyone willing to offer them. Loitering drones often carry cameras which send images back to controllers who can either direct artillery accordingly and/or instruct the drone itself to attack a target in one of many different ways. Images of grenades being dropped by drones into the open hatches of Russian tanks are frequently posted to various internet platforms. Units of the Ukrainian army have occasionally crowd-funded the purchase of drones.

Sometimes, a drone videos the target while another carries out an attack. Most recently, images from drone-sourced video have been circulated showing the effects of cluster munitions. It is sobering to watch video taken by an attack drone that rapidly approaches its target and then see the screen suddenly go blank as both the drone and the target are obliterated. 

The UK’s Ministry of Defence this morning has issued a briefing describing Russia’s latest drone innovation. The use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) has been added to the curriculum for all Russian school children. The MoD reckons that Moscow isn’t prioritising drone operation skills just yet but it is more interesting in cultivating a gradual militarisation of Russian society. That said, the drone lessons are an explicit recognition of how important the new technology is for the modern battlefield.

The fallout from the Wagner mutiny continues, with a purge of many top generals and other officials deemed to be less than 100% loyal to Putin. Which raises the question: why is Prigozhin still at large, reforming his Wagner forces in bases located in Belarus? Putin met with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko over the weekend and both men hinted that Wagner’s next target is Poland, a claim that stretches credulity but will have no doubt alarmed Warsaw.

Tuesday July 25th

In a sign that the Kremlin is worried about its influence in Africa, Putin yesterday published an article that contained vague commitments about cooperation and food shipments. The rise in grain prices following Russia’s repeated attacks on the key port city of Odessa has been, all things considered, relatively muted. Forecasts of a bumper North American harvest have helped, but many poorer countries remain worried about future prices and security of supply. Putin’s fear of arrest means he will attend the upcoming BRIC’s summit, in S. Africa, only via Zoom. Which, despite modern technology, doesn’t exactly enhance his image. 

Some African leaders are concerned about more than food prices. In recent years, Russia’s influence has been expanded by the activities of the Wagner mercenary group. The Kremlin operates a weird kind of implausible deniability with regard to Wagner’s activities. Its business model is simple: security guarantees are offered to governments and political leaders in return for mineral rights. Murder and torture are standard tactics. Until recently, Wagner’s very existence has been denied by Russian propagandists. There are several theories about what Wagner will do next. An invasion of Poland from Belarus is one story doing the rounds. More likely is a refocusing on the extraction of blood diamonds in places such as the Central African Republic.

Those repeated attacks on Odessa have surprised many observers. Most of the city’s inhabitants are Russian speakers. The city’s history is entwined with that of the Russian Empire - it was once the fourth largest city after Moscow, St Petersburg and Warsaw. Putin’s revanchist imperial ambitions would, until very recently, have had Odessa very much in mind. It seems he has given up on that idea and, now that the dream of Odessa once again as part of a greater Russia has died, seeks only to flatten the city.

Wednesday July 26th

Russia is deploying ships in the Black Sea consistent with its threat to ‘intercept’ any vessels that it deems to be heading towards Ukraine. The UK’s Ministry of defence stated this morning that a modern Russian corvette, the Sergey Kotov, is now patrolling the sea lanes between the Bosphorus and Odesa and is likely to be part of a larger task force that poses ‘the potential for the intensity and scope of violence in the area to increase’. 

There seems to be little doubt that with the land war at something of a stalemate, at least for now, Putin is seeking to gain some kind of leverage, or at least headlines, via his attack on Ukraine’s capacity to ship grain. Wheat and other food prices are, so far, only creeping up so the effects are not yet too severe. But if commodity prices were to trigger yet another wave of global inflation, hopes that the peak in Western interest rates is not too far away could be dashed. Perhaps the Kremlin’s hope is that Western support for Ukraine is so brittle that higher food prices could supply ammunition to those, particularly in the US, who wish to end the flow of cash and arms. 

The Economist today asks ‘Is Ukraine’s offensive stalling?’. Ukraine’s difficulties are well known: Russia was ready with extensive defensive fortifications and its army deployed unexpected tactics. Those defences include fields where mines are buried in layers on top of each other, rendering clearing operations particularly hazardous. Russia’s soldiers have stood their ground rather than retreating - indeed, there have been many Russian counter attacks, albeit without much territory gained. Ukraine has not been adept as hoped at complex combined arms operations. 

But Ukraine has also changed tactics. Much of its manpower and heavy equipment is still intact and held in reserve. Operations are conducted by small groups of men rather than frontal assaults. But it still lacks much of the kit it needs to make a major breakthrough. 

Thursday July 27th

Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly two months ago. Since then, the words ‘significant breakthrough’ have been noticeable only by their absence. Beginning with hints dropped yesterday by President Zelensky, multiple sources have suggested that something major has taken place  towards the southern end of the front line. Details are sparse and different sources make varying claims. 

Reports from both sides are consistent with a Ukrainian advance in Western Zaporizhia Oblast. Where those reports differ is over the Russian response. Kremlin sources admit the Ukrainians made a significant advance but were subsequently pushed back all the way to where they started. Russian milbloggers are normally quite consistent with their daily war summaries but over the last few hours have published unusually disparate reports. The Institute for the Study of War thinks this might indicate that Ukraine has achieved some degree of success.

There is no hard information. The ISW has tried to assess the scale of the battle via satellite  images, including heat signatures produced by heavy vehicles. Damaged Bradley fighting vehicles and a disabled Leopard 2 tank have been observed 2.5 kilometres behind previously established Russian defensive lines. Whether these vehicles were abandoned during an advance or retreat is not clear.

The New York Times is less circumspect than the ISW. The newspaper cites ‘two unnamed Pentagon sources’ who state that the ‘main thrust of the counteroffensive has begun’. The NYT also quotes the Kremlin’s claims that three Ukrainian battalions took part in the attack which was ‘repelled’. The ISW chides elements of Western media and officialdom for raising expectations about the scale and results of the new assault and for drawing too many inferences from very sparse data. Three battalions amounts to no more than a brigade - Ukraine is known to have multiple brigades held in reserve. 

That said, Ukraine’s war of attrition has been designed to wear down Russian defences to the point where a significant breakthrough can be made. Russia use of personnel may be the weakest part of its defensive line. The first wave of human defenders are usually poorly trained conscripts, often criminals, who cannot fall back  because of the second of defence: Chechens with orders to shoot anyone who retreats. Russia’s professionals soldiers are kept behind the Chechens. 

Friday July 28th

Unnamed US officials who briefed the New York Times to the effect that ‘the main Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun’ have now been contradicted by other unnamed officials. The Washington Post has been told that sudden increased activity on the front line amounts only to ‘shaping operations’ rather than the ‘main thrust’. Whether the unnamed officials in both instances are the same or different will probably never be revealed. 

Russia continued to assert that the big push has completely failed. Ukraine hasn’t said much other than posting pictures of a reclaimed village and admitting to losses of 200 men. There are plenty of unofficial reports of loss of heavy armour. While the initial assault was heavily mechanised, there are hints that Ukrainian commanders have returned over the last few hours to almost exclusive use of highly mobile, small troop formations. 

To add the confusion, the Institute for the Study of War states today that its initial estimates of Ukrainian gains were ‘intentionally conservative’. The ISW has used geolocated footage (as it often does) to discover Ukrainian forces operating well forward of previously assessed locations. Whether these are sustainable territorial gains remains an open question. 

One of the many asymmetries facing Ukraine relates to the availability of manpower. They have relatively limited supply and appear to care about losses, for both human and hard-headed military reasons. Russia has far less constraints and a long history of using manpower as cannon fodder. Russia’s large prison population has proved to be one source of expendable recruits.

One big user of those criminal recruits, Yevgeny Prigozhin, boss of the mutinous mercenary group Wagner, has turned up in St. Petersburg, appearing in photographs alongside African leaders at a summit hosted by Vladimir Putin. How Prigozhin is still alive, let alone in Russia, is one of the war’s many mysteries. 

The Russian President, speaking on the sidelines of the conference, made some very specific claims about Ukrainian losses - around 80% of heavy armour and 60% of the troops deployed in the attacks. Putin has, to say the least, a history of making implausible claims.