Ukraine war diary

US Republicans inch further towards Putin.

Chris Johns

I write a (short) daily post for Powerscourt, a Strategic Communications company, based in London and Dublin. The idea is to summarise the news flow around the war in Ukraine - not so much the news that makes the front pages but more the stuff that we find interesting/relevant. News that may have not attracted the attention it deserves. Anyone interested in receiving the short email on a daily basis is welcome to contact Powerscourt here: insights@powerscourt-group.com.

Monday September 18th

The late Yevgeny Prigozhin’s singular military achievement in Ukraine was the capture of Bakhmut after a long and extremely costly battle. During the many months of fighting, during which the small city was essentially flattened,  most analysts loudly criticised Russia - and the Wagner mercenary group - for focussing on a strategically insignificant target. 

Nobody ever lives the counterfactual. Bakhmut may not present its occupier with any obvious military advantage, and its capture definitely came at a grotesque cost. But what would Ukraine’s defensive forces have done if they hadn’t been tied down during Russia’s offensive? That takes us into hypothetical scenarios, all of which, presumably, would allow for those Ukrainian troops doing something else, quite possibly attacking elsewhere along the front line. Maybe Ukraine’s own counteroffensive would have started earlier. 

More recently, Ukraine’s critics have been loudly condemning Kyiv’s military operations in an around occupied Bakhmut. There is no obvious, or frontal, attempt to take the city back, but there is plenty of activity around the periphery and surrounding countryside. American officials have been particularly voluble in their condemnation of all this, arguing that Ukrainian forces would be much better deployed in the southern part of the line, in a single point of attack.

Yesterday, the Institute for the Study of War took on Ukraine’s critics. In a detailed analysis of Russian troop movements the ISW paints a compelling picture of highly mobile, elite Russian airborne (VDV) units, tied down in a defensive posture in and around Bakhmut. These forces, as their name suggests, are trained to engage in fast-moving offensive operations. Instead, they are sitting in trenches and bunkers. Kyiv has just claimed the liberation of two villages near Bakhmut  and the ISW points out that the fighting has kept fixed in place units from two our of four VDV divisions and three out of four VDV brigades. Troops that would otherwise be available for defensive operations in Zaporizhia. Or maybe even Russia’s own counteroffensive.

Tuesday September 19th

Brent oil has gone through the $95 a barrel this morning for the first time since November. That’s up almost a third, from a low of around $72, touched as recently as June. The steep and relatively sudden climb in oil prices is almost entirely due to the determination of a new alliance between Saudi Arabia and Russia. Both countries have jointly agreed to cut oil output in order to achieve a target price of $100 a barrel. Motivation is obvious: Russia needs the money to keep financing the war. What Saudi Arabia is up to is less obvious. Its immediate financing needs are less than acute than Russia’s but long term budgetary pressures arising from ambitious spending plans have been present for a while.

An oil price rise of this magnitude, if sustained, used to be called an oil ‘shock’ and would have prompted headlines about reduced economic growth and inflation problems. $100 oil could be enough to tip Europe into recession via even higher interest rates. Putin will not be displeased.

Several readers have contacted your columnist with questions about the stalemate on the war’s frontline and the conclusion reached by many that the conflict is shaping up to last a very long time. If that latter conclusion is indeed the case, perhaps the time has come for peace talks? Realpolitik to acknowledge the Russian occupation in exchange for lives saved? 

The most common response to this line of thinking is that any decision to sue for peace must be taken by Ukraine. They are the ones doing the fighting and dying. Another response focuses on Russia’s actions following any peace or armistice agreement. Putin has not shown any deviation from his core belief that Ukraine does not exist as an entity separate from Russia and could well use any settlement as a rearmament opportunity ahead of another attempt to take Kyiv. More generally, who will be naive enough to trust Putin’s signature on any document?

Wednesday September 20th

Not much may be happening in the war’s frontline but that doesn’t mean nothing is happening. The pattern established since the start of the offensive continues each day: Ukraine makes small progress, occasionally freeing a village or small settlement from Russian occupation. Ukraine is also getting marginally better each day at precision artillery strikes, reconnaissance of all kinds, drone activities and, more generally, EW (electronic warfare). In particular, coordination of all these activities is getting better. It’s called learning by doing - it also requires the leadership capabilities necessary to implement the lessons of yesterday’s mistakes.

There is increasing chatter from various sources that Russia is displaying leadership rigidity and repeats yesterday’s errors. That, in turn, is leading to high casualty rates and degradation of many different army units, including elite special forces, including Spetsnatz and Airborne divisions. The Institute for the Study of War, for example, says that poor coordination between commanders along the front line is adding to Russia’s problems, not least of which is a high casualty rate.

Ukraine has been quite specific about the losses it thinks it has inflicted. Earlier this week, Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukraine completely destroyed the combat capabilities of at least some of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 31st VDV Brigade, and the 83rd Brigade during the liberation of Andriivka and Klishchiivka, settlements in the Bakhmut area.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have locked horns again. Azerbaijan has for the past two days been conducting ‘military measures’ in Nagorno-Karabakh and says it will continue until the area’s ethnic Armenians surrender. Russia has peacekeeping forces in the region and there is a trilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia treaty that is supposed to keep the lid on tensions. Mainstream Kremlin officials called for an immediate ceasefire but ex-President Medvedev along with Russia’s head of RT, a large media organisation, claimed that Armenia is suffering because it has shown signs of cosying up to the West. It seems unlikely that Russia wants to get involved in another conflict close to its borders.

Thursday September 21st

Ukraine’s grain exports have been both reduced and diverted because of the collapse of the Black Sea deal with Russia. Some crops have been sent by rail rather ship, with Eastern European countries being the initial destination. This, in turn, has triggered a relatively minor dispute with Poland, whose farmers have reacted angrily to the new competition for their domestically grown grains and the resulting fall in prices. 

That row has now blown up, with Poland’s government placing a ban on arms shipments to Ukraine. That seems to be a halt to munitions owned and/or manufactured by Poland rather than a halt to all shipments. That’s an important distinction, because Poland sees the vast majority of Western arms shipments pass through its territory. Nevertheless, another example of fracturing European unity will delight the Kremlin. Russian news agencies are this morning prominently featuring news of the arms embargo.

Zelensky will today meet with Joe Biden and Congressional leaders. There are widespread expectations that yet another American arms package will be announced by the White House. In the latest instalment of the ‘no becoming yes’ saga of arms shipments, a White House spokesman yesterday said no decision has yet been taken over supplying advanced MGM-140 missile systems to Ukraine. The US and others now has a long history of refusing to supply sophisticated weapons only to subsequently change their minds. 

The UK’s Ministry of Defence notes that today is the first anniversary of Putin’s ‘partial mobilisation’ announcement, one that led to an additional 300,000 conscripts. That wasn’t enough. According to several policy announcements, any Russian soldier sent to Ukraine has to stay there for the duration of the ‘special military operation’. There are next to no regular troop rotations away from the frontline, leading to lack of training, exhaustion and low morale.

Friday September 22nd

President Zelensky’s visit to Washington DC was a notably lower key affair than last time with more Republicans openly questioning the level of US support for Ukraine. Kevin McCarthy, House Republican leader, denied a request for a joint address to Congress. Russian State TV celebrated all this, saying there are ‘good signals from Washington’. Zelensky was clear: without US aid, Ukraine loses the war.

The mood music in Western media has also noticeably changed. Opinion writers, politicians and anonymous hacks are trying to tease out the logical - or just potential - implications of a frozen conflict. The assumption is that the frontline more-or-less stays as it is for the foreseeable future. 

More focus is coming on corruption. Deposit Kyiv’s efforts to stamp it out, Bloomberg columnists are not alone in describing Ukraine as ‘the most corrupt country in Europe, after Russia’. Further Western aid is increasingly being linked to more anti-corruption progress. More generally, The Economist urges the West to think not just about arms for Ukraine but how to encourage the investment, both public and private, to stabilise the non-occupied part of the country. Perhaps even to get economic growth going again in the bits of Ukraine far away from the frontline.

31 US M1 Abrams tanks will start to arrive in Ukraine next week. The 4-person tank was due to arrive earlier in the year but shipments have been repeatedly delayed. Around 200 Ukrainian troops have been training to operate the tank. It is widely believed that the Abrams is too complex for effective use in Ukraine: a minor industry involving repairs, resupply and other logistics needs to be established wherever the tank operates. 

Heavy Western armour has, so far, not been of much use to Ukraine. 0.25% of occupied territory is said to have been reclaimed during the current offensive. That said, the Institute for the Study of War said yesterday that Ukrainian heavy armour has, for the first time, been spotted operating behind the third and final layer of Russia’s defensive system. The ISW isn’t yet convinced about the sustainability of the relatively narrow breach of Russia’s tri-layer defences in the Western Zaporizhia Oblast, but notes it’s potential significance.