Ukraine war diary

Another five years?

Chris Johns

I write a (short) daily post for Powerscourt, a Strategic Communications company, based in London and Dublin. The idea is to summarise the news flow around the war in Ukraine - not so much the news that makes the front pages but more the stuff that we find interesting/relevant. News that may have not attracted the attention it deserves. Anyone interested in receiving the short email on a daily basis is welcome to contact Powerscourt here: insights@powerscourt-group.com.

Monday September 4th

A lot has been learned about Russia’s first line of defences deployed along stretches of the 1000 kilometre frontline. Trench systems, tank traps and, above all,  minefields, have slowed the Ukrainian advance to a crawl. Kyiv now claims to have breached these first line of fortifications around the area of Robotyne. That means we are now likely to find out something about Russia’s second defensive tier. Ukrainian generals have been unusually forthcoming about their assessment of that likely strength. One claimed that Russia devoted 60% of its resources to the first defensive line and only 20% to each of next two. 

A lot will depend on the quality, if not the quantity, of Russian reserves deployed along the next set of defences. Various sources speak of lateral deployment of reserves, which almost certainly implies weakening positions elsewhere along the frontline.  Reserves are also coming up from the rear, something that suggests Russia’s recruitment and training capabilities  are ensuring a regular supply of fresh forces. 

Moscow is keen to persuade volunteers to sign up rather than accelerate conscription, something likely to be unpopular ahead of the 2024 Presidential election. To that end, the UK’s Ministry of Defence noted over the weekend that Russia has been conducting an advertising campaign to persuade citizens of neighbouring countries to sign up. Adverts have appeared in Armenian and Kazakhstan media outlets, offering sign-on bonuses and attractive salaries. Migrants living in Russia have been induced to join the military with promises of fast-track citizenship. The MoD notes that there are six million citizens of central Asian countries living in Russia.

Moscow’s almost unlimited ability to recruit soldiers and it’s accelerating production of arms must, as a simple matter of relative size, be greater than Ukraine’s. Hence, the retired general writing in today’s FT about ‘Ukraine winning in 2025’ speaks about the need for Ukraine to outgun Russia with Western supplied arms. Just where Kyiv is going to get the manpower reserves to last until 2025 is not clear.

Tuesday September 5th

Ukraine has made further advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast, with light infantry observed in locations beyond the much vaunted anti-tank ditches and concrete dragons teeth Russian defences. In one of those odd coincidences, this breach of the Surovikin line came on the same day as its designer, not seen since the Wagner mutiny, was released from custody. 

The Institute for the Study of War is, in fact, refusing to call it a breach just yet. It will do so only when heavy Ukrainian armour is seen joining up with the infantry. Ukraine’s progress currently is in quite a narrow section of the frontline and the ISW wants to see it broadening out as well as being accompanied by modern Western tanks. 

Much speculation surrounds the strength and capabilities of both Russian reserves and remaining artillery. We know lots about Kremlin military doctrine and it appears that the Russian army is deviating significantly from established procedures. The ISW quotes a recent Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report that noted Russian mine laying tactics have not been as scripted in the procedural instructions. Nor have the methods used by Russian artillery been according to doctrine. Two things could be at work here. First, Russian troops are adapting their techniques - ‘learning by doing’. Second, they simply don’t have enough mines or artillery shells to protect what is a very long frontline. Artillery barrels become worn after enough shells have been fired.

Russia’s appetite for more weapons has led to much speculation that an arms-for-food swap with North Korea could soon be negotiated. Pyongyang has plenty of military kit but cannot feed its people. Russia has lots of grain that is currently sitting in storage. Turkey failed in its negotiations with Putin to get grain moving through the Black Sea. Putin yesterday blamed everybody but himself for that failure.

Wednesday September 6th

According to several sources, Ukraine has been conducting an assassination campaign against enemies in both Russia and the occupied territories. The Economist joins those who liken the killings to the way Mossad deals with Israel’s opponents. The Israeli intelligence agency is said to have learned much from the Soviet Union’s early covert activities, particularly those of one Pavel Sudoplatov, who was directly involved in the assassination of Leon Trotsky. Sudoplatov was, by birth, Ukrainian, born in Melitopol, in the Zaporizhia Oblast where much of the current fighting is taking place. After joining Soviet intelligence at the age of 14, Sudoplatov spent much of the 1930s blowing up Ukrainian nationalists. 

Ukraine’s domestic security service, the SBU, began its campaign of targeted killings in 2015 after it was decided that simply jailing its enemies wasn’t working. The Economist lists key Russian commanders assassinated in the occupied Donbas, as well as recent covert operations against the Kerch bridge linking Russia and Crimea. The efficacy of the assassination campaign is sometimes questioned, as is the SBU’s ability to keep its secrets. Russian infiltration is a subject for speculation - the SBU’s head of internal security recently fled under a cloud of suspicion. 

Meanwhile, Ukraine yesterday made further limited advances in Western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Institute for the Study of War has observed Ukrainian forces being attacked by Russia northwest and west of recently liberated Robotyne. Those attacks are taking place in locations very recently under Russian control. The ISW reckons Ukraine is now on the outskirts of another settlement, Verbove.  The ISW also reported yesterday an SBU attempt to assassinate a Russian occupation official in Luhansk.

Russia’s new academic year has seen a revamp of the school curriculum, one that includes how to handle a Kalashnikov. The intricacies of drone warfare make an appearance for the first time, an indication of how the technology of war has changed. The militarisation of Russian society continues apace. 

Thursday September 7th

RIA, the state-owned Russian news agency, this morning has reported explosions in southern Rostov, Bryansk and Moscow. It sounds like a series of drone attacks, at least some of which were shot down.

Several sources today report shortages of one kind or another hindering Russian production of arms, especially cruise missiles. Sanctions are being evaded, key western components, especially chips, are still finding their way to Russia, but not in sufficient quantities to restore stocks to pre-war levels. That said, cruise missile and drone attacks continue on Ukraine, although not quite at the same intensity as last winter. Specific concern is also being voiced by Russian military bloggers about a shortage of rubber, particularly for tires. Promised replacements for worn heavy vehicle tires have yet to appear and worries are growing about mobility during the upcoming muddy winter months

Defensive systems, where they exist, seem eminently capable of dealing with missiles and drones. The greatest threat to well-defended cities like Kyiv and Moscow seems to be falling debris once Patriot, S-500 and other defensive systems are in place. That said, relatively undefended towns such as Kostiantynivka, located near the current frontline, are clearly vulnerable. The death of 17 people in the town’s market place is a reminder of what happens when missiles or drones get through defences. 

Whether or not drone debris has fallen in Romania is being disputed this morning. The matter is very sensitive because of Romania’s NATO membership. The country’s defence minister has appeared to contradict earlier official denials that bits of destroyed Russian drones have fallen on Romanian territory. The defence minister suggested a ‘serious violation’ may have occurred. 

A Ukrainian civilian was hospitalised yesterday after being blown up by a Russian mine while collecting firewood. The extent of unexploded Russian minefields will, once the war is ended, be a huge source of concern, one that today  goes largely unremarked compared to objections about cluster munitions, used by both sides. If Ukraine is finally making significant advances it is due in no small part to the recent arrival of American cluster bombs.

Friday September 8th

American defence officials are already thinking about Ukraine’s next offensive, one that will start once winter ends next year. One analyst, speaking to The Economist, predicts the frontline is destined to remain pretty static for the next five years. 

America’s Defence Intelligence Agency, with a much lower profile than its sister organisation, the CIA, has given an extremely rare interview to The Economist. The newspaper has also been talking to several unnamed Biden administration officials, one of whom reckons the current offensive has about six weeks to run before the weather starts to disrupt mobility. Hence the thinking starts about what happens when the weather gets better next spring. 

Again unusually, a named DIA senior official, Trent Maul, has gone on the record. He speaks of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan where America trained and armed local armies, only to see them collapse virtually overnight. The US really didn’t think Kabul would fall nearly as quickly as it did. Learning, or so they thought, from those earlier mistakes, DIA analysts predicted that Ukraine would crumble within days of the initial Russian invasion. Wrong again. 

Apparently, each situation has unique characteristics that make forecasting extremely hazardous. The DIA should have employed a few ageing economic forecasters who could have warned them about that.

The DIA is very cautious about about comes next. Ukraine’s  recent breach of a narrow part of Russia’s second defensive line has raised hopes that the third and (sort of) final line is now within range. Ukrainian sources who have indicated that the bulk of Russia’s,forces have been concentrated along those first two lines could, says the DIA, be wrong. Mr Maul cautions that the bulk of Russia’s reserves  are lying in wait. Nevertheless, there is a ‘realistic possibility’ that Ukraine could break through to the coast by the end of 2023. 

The Institute for the Study of War suggests both assessments of the third Russian defensive line could be correct: those defences are very ‘uneven’ along the length of the line. 

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