I haven't read the Foundations essay but I have read Ed West's post about it and have to say that this displayed a poor understanding of Britain’s economic history. Its decline as an economic behemoth did not – as the post contended – start after WW2 (although it did accelerate then). It started way back in the late 19th c. – as soon in fact as better adapted nations (particularly USA, Germany and Japan) started to compete with it. The reasons are complex but none of the principal ones were flagged in that post. Principal reasons included: 1) the peculiar resilience of the British class system meant that manufacturing enterprise (‘trade’) was always looked down on and the 2nd generation of its great manufacturing dynasties got out of it as soon as possible. Hence Britain became a place brimful of lawyers and ‘what we would now call ‘creative & media people’ but woefully lacking in technologists and nuts and bolts engineers. 2) The Empire masked (and partly caused) Britain’s uncompetitiveness for many decades because it had a captive market for its lack-lustre products. https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/thinkpieces/the-consequences-of-economic-ignorance
Also crude economic comparisons between nations can be hugely misleading. For instance:
* Norway is a huge landmass with a low density population….easy to build infrastructure there. The Lower Thames Crossing on the other hand is in one of the most densely populated (and politically quarrelsome places on earth. Chalk and cheese.
* France is a big (and mostly low density) landmass and is administed by a powerful centralised elite civil service with powers, when it chooses, to override local opposition. Britain's administative culture is the opposite of this. Again chalk and cheese.
All fair points that illustrate the point I bang on about: growth is to a significant degree mysterious and we argue about its causes. It is very complex with lots of factors involved. But it isn’t just about geology. I think that if you could control for ‘digging’ conditions you would still find British costs to be orders of magnitude greater than elsewhere. And projects would still be too long. I also think the author’s point about the UK essentially forbidding building things is a good one.
I suspect your argument about selling shoddy goods into a captive Empire would be very hard to prove or disprove. Conclusively anyway.
Growth isn’t just about building things. Ultimately it’s about innovation, technological mostly but not entirely. My steelworker father used to show me machines in museums that were more modern than the ones he used to work with. The history of nationalisation of key industries is a story, in part, of failure to invest and innovate. Just another part of the story in the day that steel making essentially ended in the UK. In Wales anyway.
Outside of planning and environmental assessments, is there anywhere comprehensive analysis as to why the UK and Ireland costs for housing and infrastructure are so much higher than continental Europe.
All the analysis I have seen points to multiple factors. It is planning and regulatory costs. Also, land and labour costs, poor project management skills, too many specification changes during the construction phase, stop-start processes & lack of continuity in long-term planning. Poor geology can contribute (that's why there are so few tube lines in South London). Every time a bone or other relic is found the project stops for a months long archaeological dig
Italian intercity trains are superb, btw.
I haven't read the Foundations essay but I have read Ed West's post about it and have to say that this displayed a poor understanding of Britain’s economic history. Its decline as an economic behemoth did not – as the post contended – start after WW2 (although it did accelerate then). It started way back in the late 19th c. – as soon in fact as better adapted nations (particularly USA, Germany and Japan) started to compete with it. The reasons are complex but none of the principal ones were flagged in that post. Principal reasons included: 1) the peculiar resilience of the British class system meant that manufacturing enterprise (‘trade’) was always looked down on and the 2nd generation of its great manufacturing dynasties got out of it as soon as possible. Hence Britain became a place brimful of lawyers and ‘what we would now call ‘creative & media people’ but woefully lacking in technologists and nuts and bolts engineers. 2) The Empire masked (and partly caused) Britain’s uncompetitiveness for many decades because it had a captive market for its lack-lustre products. https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/thinkpieces/the-consequences-of-economic-ignorance
Also crude economic comparisons between nations can be hugely misleading. For instance:
* Norway is a huge landmass with a low density population….easy to build infrastructure there. The Lower Thames Crossing on the other hand is in one of the most densely populated (and politically quarrelsome places on earth. Chalk and cheese.
* France is a big (and mostly low density) landmass and is administed by a powerful centralised elite civil service with powers, when it chooses, to override local opposition. Britain's administative culture is the opposite of this. Again chalk and cheese.
All fair points that illustrate the point I bang on about: growth is to a significant degree mysterious and we argue about its causes. It is very complex with lots of factors involved. But it isn’t just about geology. I think that if you could control for ‘digging’ conditions you would still find British costs to be orders of magnitude greater than elsewhere. And projects would still be too long. I also think the author’s point about the UK essentially forbidding building things is a good one.
I suspect your argument about selling shoddy goods into a captive Empire would be very hard to prove or disprove. Conclusively anyway.
Growth isn’t just about building things. Ultimately it’s about innovation, technological mostly but not entirely. My steelworker father used to show me machines in museums that were more modern than the ones he used to work with. The history of nationalisation of key industries is a story, in part, of failure to invest and innovate. Just another part of the story in the day that steel making essentially ended in the UK. In Wales anyway.
Outside of planning and environmental assessments, is there anywhere comprehensive analysis as to why the UK and Ireland costs for housing and infrastructure are so much higher than continental Europe.
All the analysis I have seen points to multiple factors. It is planning and regulatory costs. Also, land and labour costs, poor project management skills, too many specification changes during the construction phase, stop-start processes & lack of continuity in long-term planning. Poor geology can contribute (that's why there are so few tube lines in South London). Every time a bone or other relic is found the project stops for a months long archaeological dig
Oh dear, Chris. This is rather damning news indeed.
Effectively the UK has been legislating itself out of existence for the last 30 odd years - collective suicide 😢
My question is - are Europe & Ireland on a regulatory path that will delivery similar results?
Mario Dragi’s report seems to be pointing to it.
Yes indeed - the Draghi report is another long essay on why economic development doesn't happen. And a lot of his reasons are uk-style. But not all.